Wang Yangming’s Learning of the Heart-Mind in the Development of Chinese Philosophy*

Yang Guorong

Abstract: Wang Yangming’s learning of the heart-mind involves several important issues, including the heart-mind and things, the heart-mind and principle, the heart-mind and events, extending innate knowledge, and the original substance and effort (gongfu). On the first issue, Wang asserts “wherever the will is directed is a thing,” meaning that humans invest external objects with meaning through the directing of the heart-mind as the substance (the intentionality of the heart-mind), thus constructing a meaningful world, rather than that humans create the world in space and time by their consciousness or heart-mind. On the relationship between the heart-mind and principle, Wang combines the two with the proposition: “The heart-mind is principle.” In this way, principle, which functions as universal laws and norms, is no longer external to the individual, and thus the individual consciousness sublates its original state and obtains self-conscious features that are universal. In Wang’s philosophy, the heart-mind is connected with the unfolding of events, where events constitute the precondition for understanding things and grasping the Way, and serve as the origin in the cultivation of human beings. The cultivation of humans through events relies on innate knowledge as the content of the virtues. Innate knowledge, as the constant guide, contains rational norms and manifests itself in the feelings of “loving good and hating evil.” In the comprehensive structure of consciousness, innate knowledge is connected with the original substance, while extending innate knowledge pertains to effort. An exposition of innate knowledge and the extension of innate knowledge will clarify the relationship between the original substance and effort in the learning of the heart-mind. Generally speaking, through a combination of “elaborating the original substance through effort” and “elaborating effort through the original substance,” Wang affirms the unity of the original substance and effort.

Keywords: learning of the heart-mind, heart-mind, things, events, innate knowledge, original substance, effort

Generally speaking, there are two main approaches in the research on different schools, thinkers, and issues in the history of Chinese philosophy. One approach emphasizes grasping the unique features of each, while the other focuses on disclosing their universal philosophical implications. The same is true for the study of the philosophy of Wang Yangming 王陽明 (Wang Shouren 王守仁, 1472—1529), one of China’s most original philosophers. Wang’s learning of the heart-mind (xin心) deals with various issues, such as the heart-mind and things (wu物), the heart-mind and principle (li理), the heart-mind and events (shi事), innate knowledge (liangzhi良知) and the extension of innate knowledge (zhi liangzhi致良知), and the original substance (benti本體) and effort (gongfu工夫). From the perspectives of both Chinese philosophy and Neo-Confucianism, Wang’s discussions on the issues above deserve special attention for they reveal both the particularity and universality of Wang’s philosophical thinking.

Wherever the Will Is Directed Is a Thing [Refer to page 4 for Chinese. Similarly hereinafter]

The relationship between the heart-mind and things is an old and recurring issue in the development of Chinese philosophy. Wang Yangming addresses the issue with a unique approach. Wang famously proposes: “Wherever the will is directed is a thing.”1Wang Shouren 王守仁, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part I” [傳習錄上], vol. 1 of Complete Works of Wang Yangming [王陽明全集], eds. Wu Guang 吳光 et al. (Shanghai: Shanghai Classics Publishing House, 1992), 6. The English translations refer to Wing-tsit Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 14, with slight alterations.The “thing” in this statement means a concrete state of existence; and the “will” is connected with the “heart-mind” in its broad sense. The proposition does not mean that a world is created in space and time by one’s will or heart-mind as the substance (xinti心體); rather, it refers to the construction of a meaningful world, with external objects invested with meaning through the directing of the heart-mind (that is, the intentionality of the heart-mind). The meaningful world constructed is by no means the world as it originally is, or the world external to and independent of humans; the meaningful world has a connection with human consciousness, a state of existence to be felt by humans as actual and practical. In contrast, although a thing exists as it originally is, its existence means little to an individual who is unaware of this existence.

Wang’s proposition is so abstruse that it cannot be comprehended even by Wang’s disciples.

The Teacher was roaming in Nanzhen. A friend pointed to flowering trees on a cliff and said, “[You say] there is nothing under heaven external to the heart-mind. These flowering trees on the high mountain blossom and drop their blossoms of themselves. What have they to do with my heart-mind?” The Teacher said, “Before you look at these fl owers, they and your heart-mind are in the state of silent vacancy. As you come to look at them, their colors at once show up clearly. From this you can know that these fl owers are not external to your heart-mind.”2Wang Shouren, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part III” [傳習錄下], in vol. 3 of Complete Works of Wang Yangming, 107—108. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 222. For the sake of consistency, xin 心 which Chan renders as “mind” is translated into “heart-mind” in this paper.

As can be seen, the fl owers have two states of existence. First, they exist as they originally are, completely cut off from human consciousness. Second, they exist within the purview of human consciousness. The original state of existence can be undeniably real, but the object in this state has no connection with the human, while the second state of existence is possible only because of the object’s entry into human consciousness. The second state of existence is inseparable from the heart-mind as the substance, hence it is a humanized (aesthetic) state of existence. Therefore, Wang distinguishes between the object existing as it originally is and the object existing as meaningful to the human. A physical object in its original state is cut off from the heart-mind as the substance; that is to say, its existence is external to the heart-mind. Only after an object is internalized by and begins to interact with the heart-mind can the object obtain its aesthetic state of existence. Obviously, while talking about the fl owering trees, Wang refers to the meaningful existence of an object rather than its original existence in space.

In fact, the meaningful state of existence is not confi ned to aesthetic objects; it applies to heaven, earth, and the myriad things. Wang Yangming says,

My clear intelligence is the master of heaven and earth and spiritual beings. If heaven is deprived of my clear intelligence, who is going to look into its height? If earth is deprived of my clear intelligence, who is going to look into its depth? If spiritual beings are deprived of my clear intelligence, who is going to distinguish their good and evil fortune or the calamities and blessings that they will bring? Separated from my clear intelligence, there will be no heaven, earth, spiritual beings, or the myriad things.3Wang Shouren, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part III,” 124. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 257.

The “clear intelligence” refers to human consciousness. “Separated from my clear intelligence, there will be no heaven, earth, spiritual beings, or the myriad things” means not that the existence of physical objects depends on the individual consciousness but that heaven, earth, and the myriad things cease to exist as they originally are, and become meaningful objects, in connection with human consciousness. In a word, in the entire process, the individual consciousness plays a central and essential role.

The same is true for things and objects in social affairs. To a person not sufficiently ethically or politically aware, the objects in ethical and political relations, such as the relation between father and son and the relation between ruler and minister, are just as much physical objects as mountains, rivers, trees, and grass. The relations do not qualify as ethical concepts, nor do they have any political implications. Only through a true and thorough understanding of the ethical and political implications of the mutual affection between father and son, and the reciprocal obligations between ruler and minister on the part of the subject, can the objects be manifested as having ethical and political relations. In a word, the ethical and political meaning of an object is “created” by the ethical and political consciousness of the subject.

Wang Yangming’s approach to the relationship between the heart-mind and things departs from previous Neo-Confucian thought. Its revolution lies in not seeking to create an external object by speculative reason.

Through the development of Neo-Confucianism, there are mainly two diff erent views on the relationship between the heart-mind and things, or two kinds of attempts to give a metaphysical account of existence. The first view is vital force-based (qi-based), and its leading exponent is Zhang Zai 張載 (1020—1077). This view holds that the whole world is basically composed of the vital force, a physical object of primary importance, and it undoubtedly affirms the existence of a world as it originally is. Zhang thinks “the supreme void is the vital force.” Needless to say, the objects formed by the vital force exist as they originally are, pure objects external to and independent of the human. This state of existence is diff erent from the meaningful state of existence discussed by Wang.

The second view is principle-based (li-based), and its leading exponents are the Cheng Brothers [Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032—1085), Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033—1107)], and Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130—1200). They tend to understand the making of the world through principle and the vital force. According to Zhu Xi, empirically speaking, “principle and the vital force are inseparable,” and both are essential to the making of a concrete object; however, in ontological or metaphysical terms, principle is the origin of existence and the source of the world. Zhu says, “If mountains and rivers, and heaven and earth collapse, principle remains there.”4Li Jingde 黎靖德, ed., Thematic Discourses of Master Zhu [朱子語類], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1994), 4.As can be seen, to explain the making of the world, this theory presupposes a transcendent source (principle) and examines the connection between this source and the vital force, or, to use the terms of Aristotle, between form and matter. Still, the account of existence pertains to creation through speculative reason: the immaterial principle which is the root of all under Heaven is a guarantee of the original existence of objects external to the subject.

Diff erent from these two views, Wang Yangming’s learning of the heart-mind replaces the relationship between principle and the vital force with the relationship between the heart-mind and things. In explaining the world, it does not focus on what the world originally is, or the creation of the world independent of the human through speculative reason; instead, it focuses on exploring the different ways the world is manifested to the human, or on the human construction of diff erent meaningful worlds. This metaphysical approach constitutes an important feature of Wang’s understanding of the world. Compared to the approach that excludes the human when considering existence, it stands for, to a certain extent, a change of direction in Neo-Confucian metaphysics.

The Heart-Mind Is Principle [6]

Wang Yangming’s learning of the heart-mind tends to construct a meaningful world on the basis of the heart-mind as the substance. Within the Neo-Confucian framework, the heartmind is closely related to principle. This view inevitably leads to the issue of the relationship between the heart-mind and principle. Wang’s position on this issue is captured by his famous proposition: “The heart-mind is principle.”5Wang Shouren, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part I,” 2. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 7.To Wang, the heart-mind and principle are two sides of the same coin: the heart-mind relates more to the internal norms of the individual while principle relates more to the Way of Heaven and the Way of Humanity, which are external to the individual. The Way of Heaven refers to natural laws, and the Way of Humanity refers to social norms, both transcending the individual and dealing with what is universal. In this sense, the connection between principle and the heart-mind amounts to that between external laws and norms on one side, and an individual’s inner consciousness on the other.

For one thing, Wang knows principle, as universal law, always transcends the individual. As the metaphysical source of existence, principle is external and abstract. For another, Wang is also aware of the elevation and development of the individual consciousness, a process not without the common guidance of reason. That is, the guidance of reason is essential to the development of the individual consciousness. In this process, the clear intelligence, enlightenment, and knowledge of the heart-mind gradually transform from being a potential and a possibility to being actual, and are materialized in concrete reality. As far as the individual is concerned, before becoming a social being, he is often something of a pre-social object, with desires, emotions, and demands that are inseparable from human instincts. If he remains in this state, without the guidance of reason, his inner consciousness, or the heart-mind will become insuffi ciently conscious and universal in its content. In the history of Chinese philosophy, Daoism regards reason-based social norms as detrimental to the individual. The Daoist call to “do away with sageliness and discard knowledge” is tantamount to a total rejection of the rules and regulations established rationally in society. If this view is taken to its extreme, it is likely to lead one in the direction of an autonomous object existing as it originally is. By proposing “the heart-mind is principle,” Wang intends to emphasize the internalization by the heart-mind of principle, which finds its concrete expressions in natural laws and social norms. Through this internalization, principle is no longer external to the human, and human consciousness, ceasing to exist as it originally is, begins to possess self-conscious features that are universal. Thus the heart-mind and principle are one, or more specifi cally, the universality of reason and the particularity of the individual consciousness are harmonized.

Wang Yangming’s proposition that the heart-mind is principle aims at combining the heart-mind and principle, and is undoubtedly of a speculative nature. Specifically, Wang first affirms the unity of the Way of Heaven as common moral rules and the individual consciousness, with the insight that common moral principles can effectively shape an individual’s behavior only after they become internalized and transformed into feelings, beliefs, and wishes on the part of the individual. It is the integration of common moral rules with an individual’s moral feelings and beliefs that awakens the moral strength within. Without this integration, especially when moral rules are implemented forcefully, with little regard for or even against the individual’s will, they become dogmatic, mechanical, and empty of meaning. Because universality means transcending the specific and particular, there is the risk that it will become something merely formal. In Wang’s theory of the unity of the heart-mind and principle, the heart-mind as the substance embodies human values, feelings, and ideas, and is by no means a purely rational or formal concept.

Although rational and external rules provide guidance on actions, they often fall short of providing the inner drive to action. Therefore, they belong to what Aristotle calls the formal cause, but not necessarily the effi cient cause. According to Wang, the proposition that the heart-mind is principle is not merely static logical speculation; rather, it addresses the aspects of the inner consciousness driving moral practice. The unity of the heart-mind and principle empowers the heart-mind to undertake moral practices. In addition, if attention is focused entirely on certain aspects of the individual consciousness, such as feelings and ideas, to the exclusion of the aspect of common rationality, a predilection toward irrationality probably ensues. It is true that feelings and ideas can be the effi cient cause; however, they often have a tendency toward irrationality, and focusing on them tends to result in aimless actions and social disorder. Affirming the unity of the heart-mind and principle, Wang advocates the internalization of objects by the heart-mind to ensure that everything follows its principle, and ultimately the whole society advances toward order and stability. Wang’s thought connects the heart-mind with reason and social order, and keeps at a distance the tendency toward irrationality which might be caused by a radical departure from principle.

It can be seen, then, that “the heart-mind is principle” is an essential proposition in Wang’s understanding of the heart-mind. The proposition has several meanings. First, the general principle is integral to the individual consciousness. This line of thought overcomes the problem of elaborating the heart-mind with a disregard for principle. Second, the internalization of the general principle into the heart-mind overcomes the problem of elaborating principle with a disregard for the heart-mind. In Wang’s theory, both the rational and irrational aspects of the individual consciousness are acknowledged and appropriately positioned. In fact, in the development of Neo-Confucianism, there are two biased approaches to the issue of the heart-mind and principle. The Cheng—Zhu school emphasizes the universality of principle, which in its logic is likely to lead to speaking of principle apart from the heart-mind. Liu Jiuyuan’s 陸九淵 (1139—1193) learning of the heart-mind emphasizes the heart-mind as the substance, and hence, a humanized (aesthetic) state of existence. Therefore, Wang distinguishes between the object existing as it originally is and the gross exaggeration of equating “my heart-mind” with the universe,6Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵, “Miscellaneous Essays” [雜說], in vol. 22 of Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan [陸九淵集], ed. Zhong Zhe 鐘哲 (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1980), 273.a view bordering on elaborating the heart-mind in disregard of principle. Improving on these two approaches, Wang’s proposition establishes a connection between the heart-mind and principle, marking an advance in the development of Chinese philosophy.

Realizing the Way and Cultivating the Self through Events [7]

In Wang Yangming’s philosophy, the concept of “event” (shi事) plays an important role, and the heart-mind is also closely related to events.

First, Wang seeks to understand “thing” through “event.” Affi rming that “wherever the will is directed is a thing,” Wang states emphatically: “A thing is an event.”7Wang Shouren, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part II” [傳習錄中], vol. 2 of Complete Works of Wang Yangming, 47. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 279.That is, Wang uses “event” to explain “thing.” This method of interpretation can be traced to Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 (127—200) in his annotation to the “Great Learning” in theBook of Rites, and is inherited in the main by Zhu Xi. Wang Yangming regardsshiqin事親 (serving parents) andshijun事君 (serving the ruler) as manifestations of “things,” which are specifically moral and political practices. Broadly speaking, the word “shi事” here refers to human activities. That “a thing is an event” indicates that without a person’s handling the actual affairs of life, there is no “thing,” that is, “thing” would be empty of meaning. An important feature of Wang’s philosophy is to interpret “thing” from the perspective of “event,” or to examine “thing” in the unfolding of an “event.” It is from this perspective that Wang explainsgewu格物. He construesge格 aszheng正 (rectify),wu物 asshi事 (event), andgewuaszhengshi正事 (rectifi cation of events, or one’s acting on things during events, or leaving one’s marks on things). This line of thought is obviously diff erent from Zhu Xi’s interpretation ofgewuas the “investigation of things.”

Likewise,dao道, or the Way, is understood through events. From this perspective, Wang proposes that “the Five Classics are histories”:

A history deals with events while a classic deals with principles. However, events are really principles and principles are really events. Thus theSpring and Autumn Annalsalso is a classic, while the other Five Classics are also histories. TheBook of Changesis the history of Fuxi 伏羲, theBook of Historyis the history of the period from the time of Yao 堯 and Shun 舜 on, and the books ofRitesandMusicare the histories of the Three Dynasties. Inasmuch as the events and principles discussed in these classics are the same, is there anything wherein that can be said to be diff erent?8Wang Shouren, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part I,” 10. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 23.

That “a history deals with events” means history is the unfolding of a series of events, or history is formed by the succession of a person’s handling affairs. Wang also seeks to link the Way and the event, and to understand the Way from the perspective of the event. Wang argues that the Way does not refer to any abstract or speculative principle; instead, it is inherent in and becomes manifest in events. His view is in line with the traditional Confucian idea that “the Way manifests itself in daily routines.” Wang has made a philosophical recapitulation and proposed “the Way is the event,” confi rming that the Way is embodied in the process of a person doing their work. “Event” is a broad term, encompassing all the activities of humankind, and the Way is inseparable from and becomes manifest in all such activities. In a similar sense, Wang Gen 王艮 (Wang Xinzhai 王心齋, 1483—1541), a student of Wang Yangming, put forward the proposition that “the event is the Way.”9Wang Gen 王艮, Collected Works of the Ming Confucian Wang Xinzhai [明儒王心齋先生遺集], vol. 1 of Complete Works of Wang Xinzhai [王心齋全集], eds. Chen Zhusheng 陳祝生 et al. (Nanjing: Jiangsu Education Press, 2001), 13. See also Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲, Anthology and Critical Accounts of the Ming Neo-Confucians [明儒學案], vol. 32, book 7 of Complete Works of Huang Zongxi [黃宗羲全集], ed. Shen Shanhong 沈善洪 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Ancient Books Publishing House, 2005), 835.Later, Zhang Xuecheng 章學誠 (1738—1801), a representative of the Zhedong School, proposed that “the Six Classics are histories,” with a special emphasis on the connection between the event, the Way, and the vital force. Zhang’s approach is also characterized by understanding the Way from the perspective of the event, and hence sublates the metaphysical, speculative approach to the Way. In Wang’s view, the Way cannot be separated from the human and human activities, or it becomes an abstract object. To interpret the thing by the event and to understand the Way by the event are logically consistent and coherent.

Taking into consideration Wang Yangming’s life experience, it is easy to notice that Wang is not a pedantic philosopher. Wang’s learning of the heart-mind is different from speculative philosophies constructed in academia. From the very beginning, the development of the learning of the heart-mind was inseparable from various kinds of activities. According to Wang, thought and event are correlated. In Wang’s philosophy, thought fi nds expression in the process of pondering and reflection, which is always inseparable from the event. Moreover, from his early years to his middle and later years, Wang gradually formulated his basic Neo-Confucian doctrines by participating in various events. Affi rming the connection between the Way and the event refl ects to a certain extent Wang’s engagement in reviewing and refl ecting upon his life experience.

Based on the connection between the Way and the event, Wang further emphasizes cultivation through events. So far, the relations between the Way and the event, and between the Way and the thing have been discussed mainly in metaphysical terms. However, like other developments in Confucianism, the learning of the heart-mind is ultimately concerned with the cultivation of the self and others, which is also a central theme in Wang’s philosophy. The cultivation of human beings is also inseparable from the event. Wang Yangming once discussed this with his disciples:

I said, “One’s feelings seem to be all right when one is quiet. However, when something happens, they become diff erent. Why is it?” The Teacher said, “This is because one only knows how to cultivate oneself in quietness and does not exert effort to master oneself. Consequently when something happens one turns topsy-turvy. One must be trained and polished in the actual affairs of life. Only then can one stand fi rm and remain calm whether in activity or in tranquility.”10Wang Shouren, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part I,” 12. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 28.

Wang thinks one can cultivate oneself only through being trained and polished in the actual affairs of life.Mencius2A:2 says, “Always be doing something without expectation. Let the heart-mind not forget its objective, but let there be no artificial effort to help it grow.”11The English translation follows Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 63.Wang held these words in high regard, and often quoted them in his teaching. For example,

It makes no difference whether one is active or tranquil. There are also things when one is tranquil. Mencius said, “Always be doing something.” Thus one is always doing something whether one is active or tranquil.12Wang Shouren, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part I,” 25. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 55.

Throughout his life, a man’s effort to learn aims only at this one thing. From youth to old age and from morning to evening, whether anything happens or not, he works only at this one thing. And that is: “Always be doing something.”13Wang Shouren, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part II,” 59. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 128.

Eff ort lies wholly in the practice of the teaching that one must always be doi ng something.14Ibid., 83. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 173. “The task” in the quotes is changed into “effort” for the sake of consistency.

According to Mencius, the teaching that one must always be doing something is closely related to the injunctions not to forget and not to help, or not to forget to do something and not to “pull up a seedling to help it grow.” The emphasis, however, is always placed on the teaching of always doing something. In the same vein, Wang says,

The will never exists in a vacuum. It is always connected with some thing or event. Therefore if one wants to make his will sincere, he should rectify it right in the thing or event to which the will is directed, get rid of selfi sh human desires, and return to the Principle of Nature. Then in connection with this thing or event the innate knowledge will be free from obscuration and can be fully extended. This is the effort of making the will sincere.15Wang Shouren, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part III,” 91. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 189.

The will can be seen as the manifestation of the heart-mind, and its content is manifested in the unfolding of specifi c things and events in connection with a person’s handling the actual affairs of life. For this reason, Wang repeatedly says emphatically: “One must be trained and polished in the actual affairs of life. Only when the effort is made that way will it be benefi cial. If one merely likes tranquility, he will get confused whenever anything happens and will never progress.”16Ibid., 92. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 192.In a word, Wang thinks one cannot have any achievement without engaging in the process of handling the actual affairs of life, and it is through the “events” that one cultivates oneself.

The process of cultivating oneself through events can be called learning (xue學) in its broad sense. Since early in its development, Confucianism has attached great importance to learning, and the idea of self-cultivation through learning runs through the Confucian tradition. A very important trend in this regard is the affirmation of the connection between learning and event. The trend is reinforced by Wang Yangming, who links learning and event together. Wang gives something of a defi nition oflearning: “For this reason I hold that in seeking to acquire the ability to do things, we call the seeking learning.”17Wang Shouren, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part II,” 46. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 100. In this quote, xue which is rendered as “study” by Chan is changed into “learning” for the sake of consistency.As can be seen, learning is not about seeking to make abstract theories or speculative claims; instead, not only is the goal of learning related to the event but also the entire process of learning is inseparable from the event. Wang says,

When has the learning of the superior man departed from practical affairs and discarded discussions? However, whenever he is engaged in practical affairs or discussion, he insists on the effort of knowledge and action combined. The aim is precisely to extend the innate knowledge of his original heart-mind. He is unlike those who devote themselves to merely talking and hearing as though that were knowledge, and divide knowledge and action into two separate things as though they really could be itemized and take place one after the other.18Ibid., 52. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 112—113.

By “discussions,” Wang means, more than others, making speculations and deductions in conceptual terms; by “practical affairs,” Wang refers to the process of a person’s handling the actual affairs of life. In the process of learning in its broad sense, theoretical refl ection and discussion are indeed essential; however, “practical affairs” are more basic, serving as the foundation for theoretical refl ection and discussion.

In Neo-Confucianism, learning is often subsumed into the category ofgewu zhizhi格物致知 (investigation of things and extension of innate knowledge). However, based on the interpretation of things as events, Wang Yangming gives a new interpretation:

I interpret the wordgeto mean rectifying andwuto mean affairs or events. . . . Therefore the extension of knowledge is the foundation of the sincerity of the will. But this extension of knowledge is not something to be done in a vacuum. It is to rectify [what is wrong in the heart-mind] in whatever actual things one is doing. For instance, if one has the will to do good, then he should do it right in the things he happens to be doing. If one has the will to get rid of evil, he should resist evil right in the things he is doing.19Wang Shouren, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part III,” 119. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 248.

Given the Confucian emphasis on the cultivation of the human through learning, learning means cultivating virtue to make the will sincere. To Wang Yangming, learning in this sense and the event are always inseparable, and learning or the extension of innate knowledge takes place while a person is handling the actual affairs of life.

Generally speaking, Wang Yangming takes the heart-mind as the foundation of his philosophy, and the heart-mind in this sense is connected with the unfolding of events. The position and significance of the event in Wang’s learning can be roughly summarized in two aspects. First, the event is the basis or precondition for understanding things, the Way, and learning, so that a proper understanding of them should be based on events instead of abstract reasoning. Second, the event is oriented to the cultivation of the human, and in the process of cultivation, presents itself as the original source. To Wang, the cultivation of virtue and improvement of character is realized not through speculative discussions or vacuous instructions of the mouth and the ears, but only through the process of doing things. Therefore, although Wang’s theory takes the heart-mind as the substance, the heart-mind does not refer to merely the individual consciousness but is closely related to the process of dealing with practical affairs. In essence, the process or event is the original source of human existence.

Innate Knowledge as Virtue [9]

How to “do good and get rid of evil” in daily practice is a central concern of Neo-Confucianism. The condition for “doing good and getting rid of evil” is to distinguish between good and evil, and to distinguish between good and evil fi nds expression in the process of “knowing good and evil,” which belongs to knowledge (zhi知) in its broad sense. It then follows that moral action and moral knowledge are interlinked: the logical antecedent of moral action (“doing good and getting rid of evil”) is moral knowledge (“knowing good and evil”). Since Confucius and Mencius, the early Confucians had tried to distinguish between spontaneous actions and conscious actions. Conscious actions are based on an understanding of relevant principles and norms. Later, the Cheng—Zhu School paid more attention to this issue, advancing from affirming the relations between “knowing good and evil” and “doing good and getting rid of evil,” to emphasizing the logical priority of “knowing an ought” (grasping general norms) over “realizing an ought” (following the principle). It is repeatedly stressed by the Cheng Brothers and Zhu Xi that to use reason consciously, one needs to start with the goal of “investigating to the utmost the principle of things in the world,” and engage in the investigation of “every blade of grass and every tree.” Given this point of departure in one’s effort, knowledge takes precedence over action in the whole process, and by extension, the exploration of “principle as an ought” logically leads to the moral practice of “doing good and getting rid of evil.”

Wang Yangming does not deny the importance of “knowing an ought” to “realizing an ought”; however, he thinks knowledge and action in moral relations are more complex in content. When talking about the relationship between “knowing evil” and “resisting evil,” Wang notes that when a person does something immoral, he knows it is immoral by his innate knowledge, and the reason he becomes a mean man is that he fails to extend the innate knowledge of the good. To extend innate knowledge means to carry it out. When a man does something evil, his moral consciousness in fact never ceases in operation; in other words, he is not completely ignorant of good and evil. However, the knowledge of good and evil does not naturally lead to doing good and getting rid of evil. Obviously, a certain distance exists between moral knowledge (knowing good) and moral action (doing good), and how to do good and get rid of evil means how to progress from the knowledge of good and evil to the practice of doing good and resisting evil.

“The knowledge of good and evil” is rational knowledge in its broad sense, and mainly deals with the question of “what is,” namely, “what is good” and “what is evil,” including the distinction between good and evil, the understanding of moral rules, and the grasping of ethical relations. Although such knowledge is diff erent from factual knowledge (knowledge about what is) in the ordinary sense, it still takes the realities (existing moral rules, norms, and human relations) as its object, and therefore has something in common with knowledge in its broad sense. By contrast, moral action involves first and foremost the question of “what to do.” Logically, the question of “what is” do not entail the question of “what to do.” In this connection, Hume once argued that “what ought to be” cannot be inferred from “what is.” Then how can one establish an unimpeded connection between knowledge and action, and between epistemology and practice? That is what moral philosophy needs to address. Wang Yangming thinks “the knowledge of good and evil” does not necessarily lead to the practice of “doing good and getting rid of evil.” He is in fact aware of the logical gap between “knowing what is” and “fulfi lling what ought to be.” How can one advance from “knowing good” to “doing good”? Wang further steers the discussion onto the relationship between “investigating all the things in the world” and “making one’s will sincere.” The Cheng Brothers and Zhu Xi take “the investigation of principle to the utmost” (grasping the principle of the things in the world) as the starting point, and make moral knowledge a necessary precondition for moral action. By contrast, Wang gives priority to “making one’s will sincere,” which entails returning to and examining oneself. While explaining the meaning ofgewu zhizhi, Wang criticized the Cheng Brothers and Zhu Xi:

Former scholars interpreted the investigation of things as investigating all the things in the world. How can all things in the world be investigated? [Cheng Yi] even said “every blade of grass and every tree possesses principle.” How can we investigate? Even if we could succeed in investigating every blade of grass and every tree, how can we return to ourselves and make the will sincere?20Wang Shouren, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part III,” 119. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 247.

Zhu Xi often understoodgewuas “investigating all the things in the world,” which belongs to object-oriented cognition or understanding. However, in Wang’s view, since there is an infinite number of things in the world, it is impossible to investigate all the principle of them. Even if one manages to investigate all the things out there, how can he make his will sincere? “Returning to oneself and making the will sincere” means the cultivation of virtue, and “investigating all the things in the world” means the development of knowledge. The distinction between “making the will sincere” and “investigating things” is to a certain extent the distinction between the cultivation of virtue and the accumulation of knowledge: the cultivation of virtue is mainly to fulfill the principles of what ought to be, while the accumulation of knowledge is to grasp facts in connection with what is. Wang thinks the cultivation of virtue and the accumulation of knowledge are on two parallel tracks: the development of knowledge does not guarantee the cultivation of virtue. Therefore, the key to the problem lies not in investigating all the things in the world, but in transforming the development of knowledge into the cultivation of virtue.

To achieve the transition from gaining knowledge to cultivating virtue consists in transforming knowledge into virtue. According to Wang, the transformation can be realized through moral practice, including the processes of handling the actual affairs of life. It is in these affairs that one personally demonstrates knowledge and reason, and arrives at the state of “sincerely and concretely realizing the Way in oneself,” a state emphasized and applauded by the Confucians. The “innate knowledge of the good” in Wang’s thought is the virtue of “sincerely and concretely realizing the Way in oneself.” This kind of knowledge, demonstrated as the true self, transcends the rational aspect of knowing good and evil and becomes integrated into human existence. As Wang sees it, the distinction between virtue and conceptual knowledge is mainly that conceptual knowledge is universal, not confi ned to one individual, while virtue is always integrated into the being of a certain individual, containing the wisdom about what ought to be, and determining ontologically the qualities and features of the individual’s being. As far as virtue is concerned, the issue is expanded beyond knowing good and evil, and concerns a profound demand for realizing what ought to be. One should not merely know the good, but love the good, just as one loves beautiful colors; one should not merely know the evil, but hate the evil, just as one hates bad odors. In this way, one cannot help but do good and resist evil. Ultimately, knowing good and evil, and loving good and hating evil, “all emanate from the original heart-mind.” For genuine virtue, knowing good and doing good are two sides of the same coin.

In Wang’s view, genuine virtue is not only the inherent substance connecting moral knowledge and moral practice but also defi nes the nature and direction of knowledge and action. Knowledge itself is neutral. It can aid people in doing good as well as evil. Without inherent morality as the original substance, the more knowledge one has, the more capable one is of doing evil. In other words, knowledge in epistemological terms does not guarantee people’s doing good. Compared with knowledge in itself, virtue is not neutral and is marked by an inherent orientation toward doing good. This orientation at the same time functions as a stable mental structure for humans, leading to the cultivation of moral character that provides the specifi c direction for knowledge and action.

According to Wang’s understanding, whether or not an individual’s action is good depends on whether it comes from genuine virtue. Commenting on fi lial piety, Wang says: “If one lacks sincerity and earnestness in caring for and greeting his parents, even though he does so everyday, he is putting on a show of being filial. It can be seen that sincerity and earnestness of the heart-mind is the Principle of Nature.”21Wang Shouren, “Supplement to Instructions for Practical Living” [傳習錄拾遺], in vol. 32 of Complete Works of Wang Yangming, 1174—1175.Also, Wang thinks innate knowledge as inherent virtue is one’s own standard:

Your innate knowledge is your own standard. When you direct your thought your innate knowledge knows that it is right if it is right and wrong if it is wrong. You cannot keep anything from it. Just don’t try to deceive it but sincerely and truly follow it in whatever you do. Then the good will be preserved and evil will be removed.22Wang Shouren, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part III,” 92. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 193.

This moral standard mainly pertains to the values, referring specifically to people’s discrimination of right and wrong. As a general principle, moral standard can be apprehended cognitively, but there is more than cognition in the general sense of the term, and it involves the individual consideration and choice-making, which undoubtedly embody personal value orientations. Value judgments not only have “the knowledge of good and evil” as their content, but also provide guidance on behavior. Wang regards innate knowledge as one’s inner standard, affirming from another perspective the guidance of virtue in human actions. Value judgments contain not only rational discrimination but also emotional aspects. In fact, it is the prescriptive role played implicitly by emotions that forms the inner drive for moral actions: a person’s feeling of “loving good and hating evil” often leads to concrete actions. Apart from emotions, virtue also entails the prescriptive role played by resolution (zhi志). “Without resolution, one cannot achieve anything in the world. The techniques of various artisans all have their roots in resolution.”23Wang Shouren, “Doctrines Taught to Disciples at Longchang” [教條示龍場諸生], in vol. 26 of Complete Works of Wang Yangming, 974.Resolution is single-minded, with stability of character, and this distinguishes it from states of consciousness that are shifting and random. The rational aspects which are consistent with the Way mainly provide one with the knowledge of good and evil, while resolution prescribes that one choose good and reject evil. By making people choose good, resolution provides the inner drive for them to go from knowing good to doing good.

To sum up, in Wang’s philosophy, the transformation of knowledge into virtue means fi rst that innate knowledge plays a leading role in the individual consciousness. As virtue, innate knowledge contains within it rational norms, which get manifested through feelings of loving good and hating evil. Besides, as a comprehensive structure of consciousness, innate knowledge also includes resolution, which constantly guides people to make choices and take actions. Virtue which finds concrete expression in innate knowledge is closely related to the being of the self, and is manifested ontologically as inherent human quality. In fact, “virtue” in the history of Western culture andde德 in early Chinese culture are both ethical and ontological concepts. Historically, the two terms are loaded with metaphysical meaning. At the same time, virtue also constitutes the inner drive for human actions, and the internal basis for the development from knowing good to doing good. The moral practice of doing good and getting rid of evil mainly demonstrates self-discipline based on the inner drive of virtue. From the perspective of ethics, Wang’s theory of innate knowledge is important in providing a unique approach to understanding why doing good is possible.

An Exposition of the Original Substance and Effort [11]

The original substance (benti) and effort (gongfu) are central concepts in Wang Yangming’s learning of the heart-mind. The heart-mind as the substance and innate knowledge discussed above are related to the original substance, while extending innate knowledge pertains to effort. An exposition of the original substance and effort consists in, to a certain extent, an explanation of the relationship between the two. On the whole, Wang affirms the unity of the original substance and effort. He says, “Effort should never depart from the original substance, and the original substance from the beginning makes no distinction between the internal and the external.”24Wang Shouren, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part III,” 92. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 192.

The “original substance” in Wang’s learning of the heart-mind is diff erent from “substance” in Western philosophy, and has a unique meaning. The original substance mainly refers to the original state of the individual consciousness, and by extension a comprehensive structure or pattern of the mind or consciousness. Also, the original substance forms the internal basis in both function and structure for the process of effort, which is mainly a process of interaction between knowledge and action, with innate knowledge as the knowledge preceding Heaven, or a priori knowledge. In this way, Wang seeks to guarantee the universality of innate knowledge, to distinguish it from acquired experience. To Wang, human consciousness of experience is often associated with the specific, the individual, and the accidental, while the original substance is constant and always shining. Given its universality, everyone has innate knowledge, which precedes Heaven. “Even when erroneous thoughts arise, innate knowledge is present.”25Wang Shouren, “A Reply to Lu Yuanjing” [答陸原靜書], in “Instructions for Practical Living, Part II,” 61. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 132.

Innate knowledge constitutes that which inherently makes man a man. However, the inherent quality with its logical precedence does not necessarily entail its realization in reality. Although humans are endowed with innate knowledge, one may not be aware of it until the act of concretely extending innate knowledge begins. Thus, Wang distinguishes between the innate knowledge as inherent in humanity and that consciously realized by humans. Although innate knowledge enjoys supreme logical priority, its content can only be consciously realized through effort following Heaven. That is to say, only through the unfolding process of effort can the original substance as innate knowledge preceding Heaven be realized in reality.

The intrinsic relationship between the original substance and effort is illustrated in Wang’s talk with his disciples. For example, Wang says paradoxically: “Wherever the heartmind is, there is the true state. Wherever the heart-mind is not, there is the illusory state. At the same time, wherever the heart-mind is not, there is the true state, and wherever the heart-mind is, there is the illusory state.”26Wang Shouren, “Instructions for Practical Living, Part III,” 124. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming, 258.The first part of Wang’s words comments on effort from the perspective of the original substance, and the second part comments on the original substance from the perspective of effort. Logically, the original substance is the basis of effort, and effort is inseparable from the original substance. Effort takes the original substance as the starting point, and is under the guidance of the original substance in the process. The fi rst part affirms the existence of the original substance, and emphasizes the important role of the original substance in regulating and guiding effort. On the other hand, before effort is undertaken, the original substance is always a potential, something of a postulate, which assumes the attributes of a reality and obtains concrete content only through the effort. Therefore, the second part of Wang’s words discloses the state of the original substance as a potential before effort is undertaken. At first glance, the two statements are in contradiction, but in fact they highlight diff erent aspects in the relationship between the original substance and effort.

Seemingly mysterious, the original substance is actually a comprehensive structure of consciousness, not a transcendent entity independent of the process of effort. Unlike a metaphysical entity serving as the origin of the world, the original substance is formed and manifested in real conscious activities. Only through the process of effort can the original substance obtain concrete content and assume the attributes of a reality. Without effort, the original substance would probably be reduced to some conceptual creation by speculative reason. Wang’s understanding of the original substance seems to show a duality: on one hand, the main trend is still marked by an emphasis on a priori knowledge which is embodied by the original substance, while on the other hand, it is also affirmed that only through the process of effort can the original substance obtain the attributes of a reality. Therefore, a thorough understanding of the relationship between the original substance and effort requires a combination of “elaborating effort through the original substance” and “elaborating the original substance through effort.” To sum up, although Wang’s learning, by postulating the original substance as preceding Heaven, still comes into the domain of speculative philosophy, Wang does affirm the manifestation of the original substance in reality. To postulate the original substance as preceding Heaven is chiefly to provide an internal basis for effort. To affirm the external manifestation of the original substance is to affirm the regulatory role of the original substance on effort as well as the necessity of an unfolding process of effort in providing the original substance with both concrete content and attributes of a reality.

As can be seen, on the one hand, the function of effort lies in a conscious grasp of the original substance preceding Heaven: effort is directed at the a priori substance, and the process of effort invests the substance with attributes of a reality. Since the starting point is the original substance preceding Heaven, Wang’s thought is undoubtedly marked by an orientation toward the transcendent. On the other hand, although Wang’s emphasis on effort does not preclude a priori assumptions, it points in the direction in the future where a priori assumptions are overcome: the method of explicating the original substance through effort, if carried to the end, will lead to the predominance of effort over the original substance. Eff ort thus becomes the basis of the original substance, or as Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610—1695) says: “The heart-mind has no original substance. Where there is effort, there is the original substance.”27Huang, preface to Anthology and Critical Accounts of the Ming Neo-Confucians, in book 7 of Complete Works of Huang Zongxi, 3.In short, the original substance and effort cannot be separated, and the unity of the two is fi nally manifested with the original substance derived from effort.

From the perspective of the history of philosophy, Wang’s discussion of the original substance and effort is of great significance. The original substance proposed by Wang is speculative and transcendent, but the way Wang affirms the existence of the original substance merits more attention. In Wang’s view, the original substance is the basis for the manifestation of knowledge and action. If this internal basis is denied, knowledge and action will become either abstract or spontaneous. In the history of philosophy, the original substance is often rejected, with the internal basis for knowledge and action obscured or overlooked. A typical example in this regard is Chan (Zen) Buddhism. Members of this school tend to see all kinds of casual actions (like walking, living, sitting, and lying down) as the Way, which in this context can be interpreted as the universal basis of existence. In Chinese philosophy, the Way and the original substance are concepts of the same order. To see casual actions as the Way means to reduce the original substance to various fortuitous phenomena, and to dispense with the original substance as a stable unified structure of consciousness. Perhaps due to this, Chan Buddhism is repeatedly criticized by Zhu Xi for its mistaking “function as nature.” In the history of Western philosophy, Hume also casts doubt on the existence of the self. Hume thinks the notion of the self is an illusion. This view also shows the dissolution of the inner original substance. The deconstruction of the original substance does sublate the transcendent nature of the spiritual entity; however, it ignores the structure of consciousness as the internal basis for knowledge and action.

As far as contemporary philosophy is concerned, pragmatism focuses on the effects of context, and the solving of problems in given contexts, often to the neglect of general concepts and theories. Generally speaking, the pragmatic approach has the tendency to dispense with the original substance, and establish in its place the diversity and contingency of context. Modern analytical philosophers, especially the later Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle, show more or less a tendency toward logical behaviorism, which is characterized by the reduction of the internal to the external, or from the mind and consciousness to the body. Wittgenstein thinks: “An inner process stands in need of outward criteria,” and “The human body is the best picture of the human soul.”28Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), http://michaeljohnsonphilosophy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Ludwig.Wittgenstein.-.Philosophical.Investigations.pdf.Ryle states emphatically: “The phrase ‘in the mind’ can and should always be dispensed with.”29Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 28.These views apparently seek to disenchant philosophy; they also show the tendency to dispense with the internal structure of consciousness, and consequently they cannot be regarded as a proper understanding of the human spirit and consciousness.

The rejection of the mental original substance by Chan Buddhism and contemporary philosophy is, in the final analysis, an attempt to dispense with the internal basis for the manifestation of knowledge and action. In terms of their original features, the process of effort can be understood as the concrete manifestation of knowledge and action, while the spiritual structure, serving as the inner basis for the manifestation of knowledge and action, consists of knowledge structures and value orientations, and plays a regulatory and guiding role in various aspects of human behavior. Without the guidance of the original substance, the behavior tends to be spontaneous and blind. In this regard, Wang’s acknowledgment of the original substance is undoubtedly of great signifi cance. On the other hand, Wang uses the concept of effort to forestall the supremacy of the original substance, affirming that only in the process of effort can the original substance acquire the attributes of a reality. As can be seen, these two interrelated approaches to the relationship between the original substance and effort have important theoretical significance: elaborating effort through the original substance and elaborating the original substance through effort.

Bibliography of Cited Translations

Chan, Wing-tsit, trans. and ed.A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963.

——, trans.Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-Ming. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.